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Orbital Debris: A Perspective by Frank and Ernest
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What is Orbital Debris?
Non-operational Spacecraft Fragmentation and
Mission-related Debris
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• Orbital debris is any object in Earth orbit which no longer serves
a useful function.
Derelict Launch Vehicle Stages
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Cataloged Objects In Earth Orbit
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Iridium 33
Cosmos 2251
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Collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251
• The first accidental hypervelocity collision of two
intact satellites occurred on 10 February 2009 at an
altitude of 790 km.
— The collision occurred in a region of high spatial density,
i.e., high concentration of objects.
• Iridium 33 (1997-51C), an operational U.S.
communications satellite, collided with Cosmos
2251 (1993-36A), an non-functional Russian
communications satellite. The Iridium satellite
ceased functioning at the time of the collision.
• The collision produced more than 1700 debris larger
than about 10 cm, i.e., trackable debris.
— Approximately 200,000 hazardous debris larger than 1 cm
were created.
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Spread of Collision Debris Orbital Planes
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Debris Impacts on the International Space Station
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Debris Impacts on the Space Shuttle
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NASA Orbital Debris Mitigation Requirements
• NASA pioneered the development of applicable orbital debris mitigation
guidelines and requirements, starting in 1995.
— Orbital Debris Program established in 1979 to characterize the debris environment.
• Each NASA space program/project must prepare an Orbital Debris
Assessment Report in conjunction with the PDR and CDR milestones.
— Process seeks to minimize the generation of orbital debris during deployment and
operations and post-disposal.
• Special risk assessments are performed prior to each Shuttle mission and
following on-orbit fragmentation events.
• ISS design has been significantly influenced by the orbital debris threat.
— Approximately 5% of mass of ISS at assembly complete will be debris shielding.
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U.S Government Policy and Strategy
U.S. National
Space Policy
August 2006
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^.Current U.S. National Space Policy
11. Orbital Debris
Orbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use of space-based services and operations and to
the safety of persons and property in space and on Earth. The United States shall seek to
minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-government operations in space in
order to preserve the space environment for future generations. Toward that end:
— Departments and agencies shall continue to follow the United States Government Orbital
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, consistent with mission requirements and cost
effectiveness, in the procurement and operation of spacecraft, launch services, and the
operation of tests and experiments in space;
— The Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation, in coordination with the Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission, shall continue to address orbital debris issues
through their respective licensing procedures; and
— The United States shall take a leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign
nations and international organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris
minimization and shall cooperate in the exchange of information on debris research and the
identification of improved debris mitigation practices.
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U.S. Government and International Orbital
-VDebris Mitigation Guidelines
• The U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices were
derived in 1997 from NASA's Orbital Debris Mitigation Guidelines.
• Principal elements of the Standard Practices:
— Control debris released during normal operations
— Minimize debris generated by accidental explosions
— Selection of safe flight profile and operational configuration
— Post-mission disposal of space structures
• In 2002 the world's major space agencies adopted the IADC Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, based on U.S. guidelines and practices.
• In 2007 the United Nations adopted Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,
consistent with U.S. and IADC orbital debris mitigation guidelines and
practices.
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Green Engineering and Orbital Debris (1)
• In the initial decades of the Space Age, little thought was given to the
release of miscellaneous hardware in orbit, particularly during the launch
and deployment phase.
• Typical objects released were springs, covers for sensors and motors,
spin-up yo-yo's, and remnants of explosive bolts.
• Many missions today are debris-free by design.
• Instances of unexpected debris are investigated to determine the source
and to implement corrective measures.
— U.S. Delta IV second stage
— Japanese H-2A second stage
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Green Engineering and Orbital Debris (2)
• Spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages are passivated at end of
mission to prevent accidental explosions.
— Prior to 2007 such explosions were the principal source of hazardous orbital debris;
over 200 vehicle breakups identified to date.
— Residual propellants and pressurants can easily be vented or burned.
— Batteries can easily be discharged and removed from charging circuits.
• Launch vehicle stage passivation is widely implemented internationally and
has markedly curtailed the creation of new orbital debris.
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^.Green Engineering and Orbital Debris (3)
• To reduce the potential for future accidental collisions (and subsequent
new debris generation), spacecraft and launch vehicle stages should limit
their orbital lifetimes to less than 25 years in low Earth orbit (below 2000
km) following end of mission.
— Guideline devised by NASA and now adopted by the U.S. Government and other
foreign space agencies.
— Often this guideline can be met with existing vehicle resources.
• Spacecraft and launch vehicle stages in geosynchronous orbits should be
maneuvered into disposal orbits which will remain at least 200 km from the
geosynchronous altitude.
— Such maneuvers typically require less than 10 kg of propellant.
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Reentry Safety
• On average one known man-made object falls back to Earth each day.
— Most are small fragments and burn-up during reentry
— Components which do survive are statistically more likely to land in the water or large,
sparsely populated areas such as Siberia, the Australian Outback, or the Canadian
Tundra.
• By requiring or encouraging space system operators to limit stays in low
Earth orbit to less than 25 years, the number of uncontrolled reentries of
spacecraft and launch vehicle stages will increase, potentially posing
elevated risks to people and property on Earth.
• NASA and the U.S. Government attempt to limit human casualty risks to 1 in
10,000 per reentry event.
— This is accomplished by directing reentries over a broad ocean area (expensive option)
or by designing vehicles to demise more completely during reentry, e.g., by component
redesigns and material selection.
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^.Green Engineering and Satellite Reentries
• NASA encourages a "design-to-demise" philosophy when procuring new
spacecraft.
• Spacecraft reentry survivability is addressed by the Preliminary Design
Review (PDR) milestone. Surviving components are identified and
modified, if feasible.
• Goddard Space Flight Center has developed new demisable propellant
tanks and reaction wheel assemblies.
• Structural elements composed of high melting-temperature materials (e.g.,
titanium, beryllium, stainless steel) can sometimes be replaced with lower
melting-temperature materials (e.g., aluminum).
• Single, dense survivable elements can sometimes be replaced with
multiple, demisable elements.
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Satellite Collisions will Continue If the LargeQ
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Satellite Population Is Not Reduced
• "The current debris population in the LEO region has reached the point
where the environment is unstable and collisions will become the most
dominant debris-generating mechanism in the future" — Lou and Johnson,
Science, 20 January 2006
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Satellite Population Can Be Controlled withQ
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Debris Mitigation and Active Debris Removal
• Large debris removal starting in 2020
LEO Environment Projection (averages of 100 LEGEND MC runs)
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Conclusions
• Green engineering and operations are essential to preserving the near-
Earth space environment for future generations.
• The U.S. and the international aerospace community have been proactive in
addressing the threat of the increasing orbital debris population and the
risks to people and property from reentering debris.
— NASA has led this activity first by devoting resources to thoroughly understand the
technical issues and then by developing effective and acceptable policies and
guidelines.
— NASA also worked closely with the international community to ensure that the US
aerospace industry was not placed at an economic disadvantage.
• In the long term, the removal of large orbital debris will be essential to the
sustainability of space operations.
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